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BRAINWAVES REPORT BW/002
(ALTERNATIVE MACROECONOMICS 1)
REAL AND VIRTUAL MONEY
HOW TO AVOID FINANCIAL MELTDOWN
by
Martin Mosse, M.A., B.Sc.
January 2001
ABSTRACT
A propositional foundation is offered for macroeconomics
in terms of 'real' and 'virtual' money, and 'well' and 'badly' behaved
economies, all of which are defined. The unique characteristics of
commodity money, and specifically gold, render it incomparably proof against
both inflation and meltdown. The worldwide failure of the Phillips curve in
the early 1970s is explained as a direct result of the cancelled dollar gold
standard in August 1971. This signalled an era of 'bad' behaviour, which
was compounded in the UK when the cash ratio method of credit control was
terminated one month later, causing unprecedented inflation. Two
'Resolutions' are offered for recovering 'good' behaviour.
GENESIS
This paper owes its genesis both to William Rees-Mogg's
short book The Reigning Error
on the gold standard, and to Professor Glyn Davies' monumental study, A
History of Money.
For furtherenlightenment I have turned to M. Burda and C.
Wyplosz's standard work, Macroeconomics - a European text.
Raw data have been taken primarily from F. Capie and A. Webber, A
Monetary History of the United Kingdom, 1870-1982, Volume I.
THE UNIQUENESS OF COMMODITY MONEY
Michael Stewart, in his book Keynes and After,
voiced in 1967 an impatience with gold not uncommon today:
In any case, it is high time the world grew up and
stopped regulating its affairs by reference to the production of one
relatively useless mineral.
Beyond the fact that 'useless' is scarcely a description
of gold in our technological age, I believe he was economically mistaken.
Let me begin to explain why by introducing the concept of commodity money,
turning to Burda and Wyplosz for their definition of it as
forms of money that have intrinsic value in other uses,
or derive their value from the commodity out of which they are made, chiefly
gold or silver.
We shall call this Definition 1 (D1). They might with
full justification have included cowrie shells, of which Davies writes:
Of all forms of money, including even the precious
metals, the cowrie was current over a far greater space and for a far
greater length of time than any other.
Oil ('liquid gold') is also today a commodity quoted in
the press, but owes its value not to any intrinsic attractiveness but to its
essence as a consumable good. Hence, for all its dominant role in the world
economy, it would make a poor choice for a currency: if present trends
continue, one day there will be none of it left! Hence for the purposes of
this paper, references to commodity money in today's context are intended to
denote metallic money, and specifically gold.
D1 contrasts with the definition given by Burda and
Wyplosz for fiat money, as
money which the state declares to be legal tender
although its intrinsic value may be little or nothing.
which we adopt as D2. Upon this foundation they begin to
draw a priceless distinction:
Money is an asset for those who hold it. With the
exception of commodity money, however, it is always someone else's
liability,
which they elaborate as follows:
This is why, in the end, modern money - in contrast to
gold or silver money - ultimately rests on the trust of agents in their own
economies. To bolster this trust, regulations are designed to enhance the
creditworthiness of the banking sector. Yet, banking panics may occur in
troubled times, when the value of such regulation may be called into
question. Out of concern for their wealth, people withdraw their deposits
to acquire foreign currencies or other non-financial assets such as gold or
durable goods. When the chain of confidence breaks down in one place, the
whole fragile edifice can come tumbling down.
There is thus a qualitative distinction between commodity
money and all other forms. I believe that this distinction is fundamental
to the whole subject of economics. Upon it I wish to build a second
distinction, between 'real' and 'virtual' money, as follows.
REAL AND VIRTUAL MONEY
I define as real money,
whatever is perceived in a given economy and at a
given time to be money in its most available (liquid) form (D3).
Often in the past this role has been assumed by commodity
money (D1). In today's economies real money is usually thought of as fiat
money (D2) such as cash (banknotes plus coins). It is to the real money of
the day that we look for the anchor to our currency.
I now define virtual money - called
money-substitutes by Davies
and also sometimes designated quasi-money - as
any form of money which is at least one step in liquidity
removed from what at any time is perceived to be real money (D4).
In this category for instance came banknotes in the days
when real money was metallic (gold or silver commodity money). Today there
is a whole battery of different types of virtual money of varying liquidity,
including bank and building society accounts of various kinds, cheques,
Treasury bills, certificates of deposit and so forth, and arguments rage as
to which if any of the various measures of money supply M0, M1, M2 etc each
of these belong. Virtual money is present in all but the simplest economies
and owes its presence to the convenience it offers - for instance in terms
of transfer or physical transportation. Without it economic life of any
complexity would be very difficult.
Through this window I believe we can helpfully view the
currency issues of our day.
WELL AND BADLY BEHAVED ECONOMIES
Borrowing a concept from mathematics, I now want to
define a well behaved economy (D5) as one
(a) in which cause and effect may be readily
discerned (D5(a)), and
(b) which can be usefully described in terms of
relatively simple relationships (D5(b)),
and a badly behaved economy (D6) as the converse
of this. I should stress that good and bad behaviour in this sense are not
measures of prosperity. An economy can be well behaved whether it is in
boom or in bust. There is normal behaviour appropriate to each phase in the
business cycle. Further, there are degrees of good and bad behaviour
depending on the extent to which the two criteria are, or are not, met. Let
me then illustrate the criteria.
First, as an instance of cause and effect I would
cite the mechanism whereby the use of metallic money generates stable prices
as argued by Professor Ivor Pearce in the following extract:
What we call money today is not money at all in any
rational sense of the word. Anything which is really money must have an
exact and lasting value defined in terms of commodities.
Our predecessors went to extraordinary lengths to meet
this elementary requirement. One pound sterling in the early 14th Century
meant one pound (troy) weight of fine silver. To own a silver penny meant
to own a piece of silver weighing 1/240
lb.
The value of this object would not fall below its cost of
production; for if it cost two silver pence to mine one pennyworth of silver
nobody would mine it. And if it cost only one half-penny to dig out one
pennyworth of silver, 100 percent profit could be made from mining. More
silver would appear and the price of commodities would rise until the cost
of mining or importing one penny became again one penny.
Nobody needed to control the money supply. Both the
value and the quantity of money was determined in the market just as any
other commodity. This is the simple mechanism which kept the cost of living
more or less constant for many hundreds of years.
Second, to illustrate simple relationship I offer
in the first instance the portion of Figure 1 to the left of the vertical
line placed at 16 September 1971, and the reverse on the right of this
threshold. The graph depicts the Keynesian relationship between the income
velocity of money supply measures M1 and M3 and the yield (%) of Consols
between 1922 and 1982.Q3.
Income velocity is defined here as GNP divided by the appropriate measure of
money supply. Consols were chosen for their purity as irredeemable in
representing long term interest rates.
In order to quantify the change from 'good behaviour' to
bad I have computed the correlation coefficients between the Consols yield
and each of the two money supply velocities as follows:
Pre-16.9.1971 Post-16.9.1971
M1 velocity: Consols yield
0.9452 0.5032
M3 velocity: Consols yield
0.8884 0.0914
So before the threshold date both M1 (particularly) and
M3 exhibit a high correlation with Consols yield. After that date this
relationship is significantly lost in the case of M1, and totally
obliterated for M3.
The 'simple relationship' that existed prior to the
threshold date between the Consols percentage yield (denoted C) and M1
velocity (denoted VM1)
may be modelled by the linear function
C = 2.084 * VM1 -
1.696
where the residual errors over 75 data points have a
standard deviation of less than 0.648.
The theory behind this relationship is described in F. W.
Paish's edition of Benham's Economics.
I have not seen it documented in any textbook written after 1971.
A second instance in which good behaviour is
characterised by a simple relationship is to be found in the Phillips curve.
In 1958 A. W. Phillips wrote a paper
which made his name a household word in economics circles ever since. In a
brilliant survey of the UK economy from 1861 to 1957 he argued for and
seemingly demonstrated what was an inverse trade-off relationship between
the rates of unemployment and wage inflation. On this priceless discovery
the hopes of many macroeconomists were raised high. The Phillips curve was
indeed one of the archetypal simple relationships apparently characterising
well behaved economies.
Phillips gave the equation of the curve as the
relationship
y + 0.900 = 9.638x-1.394
or
log (y + 0.900) = 0.984 - 1.394 log x
where
y is the rate of change of money wage rates, percent per
year
x is the percentage level of unemployment.
It is illustrated in Figure 2 against a background of
(price inflation
v unemployment) values for the UK between 1914 and 1970.
As can be seen, with the exception of the four erratic years 1921, 1922,
1940, and 1941 to which we shall return, the fit is wholly credible: data
points are more or less evenly distributed either side of the curve. This
is quite impressive, considering that the time span includes two world wars
and a variety of monetary regimes.
However such hopes began to be dashed in the 1970s when
the relationship seemed to break down as high inflation and high
unemployment were both experienced simultaneously - bad behaviour in the
extreme - in the UK and elsewhere. While such 'stagflation' itself proved
mercifully to be a temporary phenomenon, the regularity detected by Phillips
was never recovered. Such a failure of the Phillips relationship is
depicted in Figure 3 in relation to the UK between 1971 and 1997. As can be
seen, all the data points lie to the right of/above the curve, which can in
no sense be said to summarise them. Bad behaviour has prevailed.
We have here therefore a second such 'simple
relationship' which we believe typifies well behaved economies and is
largely absent from badly behaved ones.
Let us now examine the reasons for the dramatic change
from an exhibition of exceedingly good behaviour in the UK economy to one of
very poor which I have dated to 16 September 1971. There are two such, the
first a global external shock to real money, the second a self-inflicted
blow to UK virtual money, and they occurred within one month of each other.
We will look at the fate of the virtual component first.
ABOLITION OF THE CASH RATIO 16 SEPTEMBER 1971
Under the 'cash ratio' system of credit control which
operated in Britain between 1945 and 1971, the London clearing banks were
obliged to ensure that the ratio of (real) cash which they held to (virtual)
account deposits never fell below 8%. This system rendered a highly
efficient means of controlling credit and so money supply in the banking
sector. The discipline so imposed between the virtual and real components
of the money supply contributed to the traditional 'well behaved' economy
illustrated in the left portion of Figure 1 and in Figure 2. It is also
depicted in the left hand portion of Figure 4, where the 8% cash ratio can
be seen maintained as the almost horizontal stretch of the London clearing
banks' curve between 1945 and 1971.
During this time the Retail Price Index grows only modestly (though rather
faster than earlier in the century when for all banks the cash ratio often
exceeded 10%).
However on 16 September 1971 the cash ratio limit was
removed by the Heath government as part of the unfortunate 'dash for
growth'. It was replaced by a very much less efficient system of
'Competition and Credit Control' which while quite justifiably applying to
all banks and quasi-banks such as the emerging building societies,
nevertheless lacked in its 'reserve asset ratio' the disciplinary teeth of
its predecessor. The result was a credit explosion of disastrous
proportions. The Secondary Banking Crisis which followed in December 1973
threatened the whole British banking world with collapse. Rescue was
however achieved by the magnificent 'Lifeboat' operation launched by the
Bank of England on 29 December. Nevertheless inflation, as can be seen from
the right hand portion of Figure 4, took off at a rate scarcely seen in
Britain's history, which took successive governments years to subdue. Even
Mrs Thatcher's famed monetarist experiment, which did not include the
restoration of the cash ratio, proved disappointing in terms of inflation
statistics.
'Bad' behaviour had prevailed as depicted on the right hand side of Figure
1. The reserve asset ratio was finally abolished in August 1981. I
understand that present day cash ratios are of the order of 1%.
INFLATION
We turn now to the ever-present topic of inflation. I
take on board here Lord Rees-Mogg's case
that currencies founded on the gold standard are by their very nature proof
against endemic monotonic price inflation. Lord Rees-Mogg founds his
argument on the table 'Prices since 1661', which he has reproduced from
The Economist of July 13 1974, and which forms Table 1 to this paper.
In the opinion of the present writer he has proved his case well beyond all
reasonable doubt.
We can see from this table that between 1661 and 1914,
for most of which Britain was subject to first a silver,
then a gold standard, prices actually underwent a net fall of 9%. In
the interim they had both risen and fallen, so that the index recrossed
eleven times its starting value of 100. This astonishing performance -
contrasted below with expectations under present day 'low' inflation - is
convincingly attributed by Lord Rees-Mogg to the prevailing metallic
standard. Such a standard is defined by the discipline of convertibility -
the right, guaranteed by government, to convert (virtual) paper money into
the equivalent in (real) precious metal.
In 1914 convertibility was suspended, never since to be
restored in Britain in respect of coinage, although world currency ties with
gold were not finally severed until on 15 August 1971 President Nixon
unilaterally terminated the Bretton Woods agreement which since the end of
World War II had made gold available to the world at $35 per ounce. As can
be seen from the end of Table 1, British prices then rose faster than ever
before.
Lord Rees-Mogg is in very good company. Hear for
instance Alan Greenspan, longstanding Chairman of the US Federal Reserve
System:
In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to
protect savings from confiscation through inflation.
Capie and Webber likewise write of 'the automatic
safeguard against inflation provided by the gold standard'.
Hear also the comment of Professor Davies - no advocate
of a return to the gold standard in our present age - when surveying the
historical rise in the acceptance and circulation of banknotes in Europe:
Printed money supplemented minted money, moderately at
first when linked together through the principle and practice of
'convertibility', but later without limit when governments found it
expedient to abandon convertibility despite the inflation which inevitably
followed, and which in turn could be cured only by relinking paper money
to gold or silver or some combination of both
(my italics).
I therefore write as Proposition 1:
Commodity currencies are by their nature, at least in
the long run, not subject to price inflation as long as the discipline of
convertibility is maintained (P1).
We can now make a very pertinent observation. We have
noted above the rampant inflation which arose when the cash ratio limit
disciplining the relationship between (real) cash and (virtual) clearing
bank deposits was removed in 1971. Both then and according to P1 under
commodity currencies, the critical factor in preventing inflation was the
maintenance of the discipline linking the virtual to the real components of
the currency; when that discipline is removed, inflation soars. So we can
now posit Proposition 2:
A major cause of inflation is the severing or relaxing
of the link of discipline which binds virtual to real money (P2).
This kind of cancer is one manifestation of bad
behaviour, afflicting primarily the virtual component, be it multiplying
banknotes or mushrooming credit. Another manifestation arises when the real
component moves further and further away from commodity money. This latter
we now illustrate from the history of the Phillips curve.
THE VANISHING PHILLIPS CURVE
For the account of the external shock to the UK economy
in 1971 relating to real money, we return to the Phillips relationship,
which in the early 1970s ceased to work, not just in the UK but in countries
all the world over. Burda and Wyplosz comment on 'the puzzle of the
vanishing Phillips curve':
Over nearly a century, the inverse relationship between
inflation and unemployment seemed relatively robust. Yet the breakdown
occurred in all countries at about the same time and in a similar systematic
fashion. The challenge is to explain the existence of a Phillips curve and
its disappearance, as well as the striking similarity between different
countries' experiences.
Let us make three observations.
(1) The Phillips relationship worked excellently during
the years 1861 to 1914, during which the full classical gold standard was
operative in the UK and many other countries.
(2) It is claimed to have gone on working also from the
end of the First World War until the late 1960s.
During much of this time there was widespread use of a gold exchange
standard, based first on the dollar and the pound (while Britain was subject
to a gold bullion standard 1925-1931), then on the dollar only - the Bretton
Woods system which started at the end of the Second World War. This 'dollar
standard' began to peter out in 1968, finally ceasing on 15 August 1971 as
described above.
(3) This termination of the Bretton Woods gold exchange
standard was by its very nature a massive simultaneous shock to all the
world's major currencies. It also coincides with the beginning of the
simultaneous failure of the Phillips relationship in 'all countries' noted
above.
It would appear that we do not have to look very far for
an explanation of the mystery. So we declare Proposition 3:
The Phillips curve relationship works exceedingly well
in the presence of a full gold standard, sometimes even of a remote or
partial one, but cannot be relied upon to do so otherwise (P3).
What has happened here is a progressive moving of real
money in different seductive steps and in different countries away from its
natural anchor in the commodity gold. Finally in 1971 the anchor was cut
loose altogether and all over the world the inflationary balloon went up.
So the explanation is very simple. The Phillips curve is traditionally
viewed as a relationship between the forces which produce inflation and
those which produce unemployment within a closed economy. When an external
shock is received of the magnitude of the cancelling of Bretton Woods which
affects the first of these very much more than the second, the pre-existing
relationship is by definition broken. There is no mystery. Effect has as
usual followed cause. From which, recalling D5(a), we may derive
Proposition 4:
The world economy itself is susceptible to description
in terms of good and bad behaviour (P4).
(See for instance the success of the International Gold
Standard in the last quarter of the nineteenth century described in Davies'
section 'The final triumph of the full gold standard, 1850-1914'.)
In Britain this abandonment of the dollar standard
occurred just one month before the hapless abolition of the cash ratio limit
discussed above. The effect was the doubly catastrophic 'stagflation', the
very antithesis of the previously well authenticated Phillips relationship,
as depicted in Figure 3. The writer can personally recall the distant
echoes of consternation in the Treasury as this later became recognised.
Our well behaved economy had quite understandably gone beserk!
We are now in a position to explain the erratic years
1921, 1922, 1940 and 1941 on Figure 2 which appear to breach the Phillips
relationship exhibited by the rest of the plot. In each of these years the
pound was related to gold by no form of gold standard, not even a remote or
partial one. P3 therefore applies. We should not be surprised.
We can now posit Proposition 5,
An economy falls increasingly into the risk of bad
behaviour the further the real component of its money supply drifts from
commodity money (P5),
and its converse Proposition 6:
An economy may be expected to show a strong propensity
towards good behaviour when the real component of its money supply is
commodity money (P6).
From P4 and P6 we can predict Proposition 7:
The world economy will behave increasingly well when
its real money supply reverts to gold (P7).
This Proposition is in acknowledged conflict with some
prevailing currency trends.
This analysis, that the year 1971 represented a watershed
in the UK and world economies, finds some support in an essay by Dr Charles
Hickson of the University of Belfast in a small volume on money transmission
put out by the Association for Payment Clearing Services in 1995.
It would appear that M2, which used to exhibit a relatively constant
velocity, ceased to do so 'beginning from mid-to-late nineteen-seventies',
thereby embarrassing the Monetarists, whose models then consistently
over-estimated the effect of money growth upon prices. Their search for a
new definition of money which would restore the status quo and enable them
once more to predict future price levels has so far, it seems, been in vain.
I would suggest that this problem is not far removed from
that discussed in relation to Figure 1, allowing for a lag of a few years
after 1971 before it became apparent.
THE M-WORD
There is a further ill relating to the real component of
an economy, which occasionally flashes across our newspaper headlines, but
which we mostly prefer not even to think about. It is meltdown,
which I define as
the total loss of confidence in an economy (D7),
global meltdown being
the total loss of confidence in the world economy (D8).
So horrendous is it that it does not even get an entry in
the current Penguin Dictionary of Economics.
Davies, who is deeply concerned about the ending of inflation, makes no
reference to meltdown in his index and I have not found the word used
anywhere in his book. Burda and Wyplosz do not mention it in their
Glossary. But its reality will be known to any economist who in recent
years has had cause to shudder at the news from Russia or the Far East, and
as such it forms the subject matter of George Soros' recent book, The
Crisis of Global Capitalism.
It is the extreme of the 'banking panics' to which Burda and Wyplosz refer
in the quotation on p.2 of this paper, as a result of which 'the whole
fragile edifice can come tumbling down'.
This loss of confidence is, I suggest, primarily an
inadequacy of the real component of the currency affected. We have already
seen that fiat money (D2) depends for its effectiveness upon public
confidence, whereas commodity money (D1), possessing an intrinsic worth of
its own, does not. That is, in traditional textbook terms, commodity money
is a store of value in its own right, and as seen above, no one's
liability. Any wise and wealthy Russian who ten or twenty years ago managed
to sell his surplus roubles on the black market for, shall we say,
krugerrands would understand. During the recent meltdown of the Russian
economy he will have had far fewer anxieties than his less wise but equally
wealthy neighbours.
This leads us to Proposition 8:
The closer the real component of an economy is to
commodity money - the precious metals - the more likely it is to be proof
against meltdown (P8).
THE FREE LUNCH
In 1914, on the eve of the First World War and as
previously between 1797 and 1821 on account of the Napoleonic wars, gold
convertibility was cancelled within Britain. Prior to that, banknotes
issued by the Bank of England were contracts, bearing as today a slogan to
the effect 'I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of...', showing
the sovereign's head and signed by the Governor of the Bank of England.
They were issuable to the public in exchange for an equivalent sum of gold
coins, on the understanding that the same amount of gold coinage would be
returned to the bearer upon representation to the Bank. As such they
functioned as transferable cheques made out in round numbers of pounds.
Renunciation of convertibility was therefore a breach of
contract made by the Bank with every money-bearing citizen of the land.
Gold sovereigns which had been lent by the public to the Bank in exchange
for banknotes were - and without warning - never returned. In today's
terms, this would be the equivalent of all banks unilaterally and
instantaneously refusing to cash cheques or to issue cash in any other way.
Real money is thus abolished. Economic activity would continue for as long
as people trusted the virtual money that remained, but they would never see
the real stuff again. The cashless society would have arrived - the
ultimate triumph of convenience over sanity.
Small wonder then that after the war there was a
universal expectation that such contracts would be made good again by
restoration of convertibility, as previously in 1821 after the Napoleonic
Wars. Such hopes were disappointed. Churchill's creation of the 'gold
bullion standard' in 1925 (doomed from its start by pegging the currency to
the then unrealistically high pre-war value of £3 17s 10½d per fine ounce of
gold) did not include a return to gold coinage. Instead, following a policy
traced by Davies to Ricardo,
gold was available only as bullion for foreign exchange.
As far as ordinary citizens were concerned, the severance
in 1914 of the link between real and virtual money caused the understanding
of 'real money' to slip without due recognition from gold coinage to
(previously virtual) banknotes plus non-gold coins. But, as today, the
promise remaining on those banknotes was a fiction. The breach of contract
was never made good. Today now that the anchor has been cast away, all you
can get for a banknote is another piece of paper, a number on a computer
screen, a bag of token coins, or some good or service whose value with few
exceptions diminishes monotonically. We have grown used to ignoring the
promise which is no longer kept, while our currency, which serves reasonably
as a medium of exchange, performs only moderately as a store of value.
The Bank of England has therefore been enjoying a 'free
lunch' ever since 1914. And as always, there is a hidden price. Slowly at
first, but increasingly obviously as the century went on, Britain found
itself to be the victim of endemic, ineradicable inflation such as never
before. If therefore my argument is correct, our present self-inflating
currency is founded upon a breach of contract and sustained by general
connivance in a fiction. This is no way to do business! We should not be
surprised if yet again effect follows cause.
Put another way, it would appear that by continuing to
issue banknotes bearing promises which are null and void, the Bank of
England have themselves caused what they themselves - in the quotation given
in the next section - declare to be their own 'central problem', preventing
inflation. One can but sympathise.
THE SITUATION TODAY: 'LOW' INFLATION
Today inflation no longer runs at the horrendous rate of
19% or so per annum which prompted Lord Rees-Mogg's book in 1974.
Nevertheless, even in these days of 'low' inflation, we have been
acclimatised to the belief that inflation of some kind is now a necessary
fact of life, a monster that can at best be tamed but never killed. So we
applaud governments and banking systems which minimise it,
without any suspicion that it is a disease that can even in principle be
cured by the right prescription. Even Davies, who is more sanguine than
most, still writes of
the appealingly simple but misleading and excessively
costly goal of zero inflation.
So 'low' inflation is today regarded as an adequate
target for modern banks and governments. Hear for instance the Bank of
England:
The central problem for monetary policy is how to
maintain the value of the currency - ie price stability. Since the Bank of
England was granted operational independence in May 1997, this has been
defined by the Government's 2½% target for inflation on the RPIX measure.
Similarly also an acceptance of inflation is
institutionalised in the very first of the EMU convergence criteria of the
Treaty of Maastricht:
The criterion on price stability referred to in the first
indent of Article 109j(1) of this Treaty shall mean that a Member State has
a price performance that is sustainable and an average rate of inflation
that does not exceed by more than 1½ percentage points that of, at most, the
three best performing Member States in terms of price stability.
This acceptance that inflation is inevitable is echoed by
the European Movement, until recently British champions of the European
Single Currency:
Low inflation, guaranteed by an independent central bank,
will protect the value of personal savings.
Yet it was not always thus. As we have seen from Table
1, the situation which has prevailed since 1934 in which retail prices never
fall is only a modern phenomenon. Previously, at least since 1661, prices
in Britain have both risen and fallen. So Davies writes how in 1951
Britain...was beginning to experience a new kind of
long-run persistent inflation, in which price levels seemed to have lost
their previous tendency to fall during cyclical recessions.
The date 1934 is significant as being a lag of just three
years following the demise of Churchill's gold bullion standard, and only
two years before the publication of Keynes' General Theory.
In relation to the last thirty years, a 'low' annual
inflation rate of 2½% might well be regarded today as a triumph by a proud
government. It is however worth considering some of the implications of
such a success.
A price index which began today at 100 and increased
annually by 2½% would after 253 years reach a value of 51,658. At a rate of
only 3½% per annum this becomes 602,433. We may compare this with the
change already noted from Table 1 in the same time interval between 1661 and
1914, when under metallic standards the price index reproduced there
actually fell from 100 to 91.
In previous centuries it has always been possible through
good management of the currency to recover price stability and even reduce
prices following years of abuse or neglect. This prospect, made possible by
a metallic standard, is no longer offered to us. Without a currency basis
in a commodity which has intrinsic value in its own right (D1), prices have
no anchor. So Davies begins a paragraph in his chapter 'Global Money in
Historical Perspective' with,
When modern paper money released prices from their
metallic anchors....
That, once untethered, prices then rise rather than fall,
is simply a consequence of human greed, the limiting of whose effects must
surely rank as one of the fundamental tasks of the economist.
It has been fashionable since Keynes to decry the
stringencies of the commodity money through which this now vanished price
stability was achieved. Michael Stewart, quoted at the start of this essay,
is simply following in the tradition of Keynes's comments about the 'Golden
Yoke'.
So Davies can write that the Cunliffe Report of December 1919 was
calculated to please the City - and to crucify the
economy on an outdated cross of gold.
When the Gold Standard (Amendment) Act was passed on 21
September 1931 abolishing the gold bullion standard, Davies comments that
the gold shackles had been broken for ever.
Without beginning to suggest that there may be a
pain-free solution to any of our economic ills, I would argue from the above
calculations that the punitive consequences of even 'low' inflation
sustained monotonically without limit would ultimately be at least as
destructive of British society as anything experienced under the (sometimes
misapplied) gold standard.
CONCLUSION
We live in an age dominated very much by the convenience
afforded us by the rapid advances of automation and communications
technology. Possibilities lie open to us for extending the variety and
quantity of convenience-based virtual money as never before. Today's
computer screen money is 'virtual' in the most literal sense imaginable.
Those who deify technology will be tempted as never before to cut our
economic anchor and abandon real money altogether.
However, we should observe three cautionary tales. The
first is Professor Davies' gory account of how a single rogue operator in
February 1995 managed in a very short time to bring down Barings, a merchant
bank which had acquired its high reputation during more than two centuries
of trading.
The second recalls the fear-inspiring Y2K 'millennium
bug', now quickly forgotten, to combat whose terrors billions were spent all
over the globe.
The third relates how the 'love bug' virus, propagated
through the internet in May 2000 by just one young man, is estimated to have
crashed in a single day approximately half of the world's computers.
At the best of times, technology makes a very unreliable
god. Today it offers greater power to the unscrupulous and the foolish than
ever before. To place more and more of our faith in virtual, fiat money, on
account of its ever increasing speed and convenience, is to ignore the
constancy of human nature and court a wholly unnecessary but highly probable
nemesis. Unless we recover our anchor in commodity money our currency
may one day drift away altogether. This threat applies both to the euro
and to the floating pound as at present constituted, in both of which
inflation is institutionalised and, since both as fiat money depend
ultimately upon the fickleness of human confidence, neither offers any real
security against global meltdown.
Learning therefore the lessons of P1 to P8, I would
suggest two Resolutions by means of which we can begin to protect our
currency and our economy. Taken together they offer a security (from
meltdown, P8) and a stability (from price inflation, P1 and P2) which are
afforded by none of the available alternatives. The Resolutions may be
thought of as
a discipline for virtual money (R1), and
an anchor for real money (R2).
So:
We should take whatever steps we can to ensure that
all forms of virtual money are tethered by firm discipline to those that are
more real (R1).
Thirty years ago this would have meant restoring the cash
ratio, which, being variable and administered by the private sector, would
have offered an excellent tool for regulating the money supply in addition
to today's overloaded interest rate mechanism. Should this prove
temporarily inappropriate, other means must be devised. Next:
At each juncture we should choose the option which
will lead our real money more closely back to a base of gold (R2).
John Laughland suggests a way ahead as,
The Bank of England should be privatised; it should mint
a gold coin, the sovereign;
and banknotes should be issued which are convertible on demand into it.
For more detailed proposals we may turn to Lord Rees-Mogg's
chapter 'Conquering the Monster'.
Even if immediate return proves not to be practical, as Hayek reluctantly
concluded,
nevertheless it could profitably become a longer term intention as we begin
to see R1 being carried out. Our model for this process might well be the
step by step approach to the gold standard adopted by Britain in the early
nineteenth century prior to its formalisation in the Bank Charter Act of
1844.
One option for consideration before actual gold coinage were feasible might
be a form of gold bullion standard as a stepping stone, this time at a
realistic price. At least we would have the lessons of history to guide
us. Following R2, for instance, would have averted the crisis which erupted
when the Treasury began to sell off up to half of Britain's gold reserves in
July 1999. On that occasion widespread disaster was averted only by the
timely intervention of Wim Duisenberg, President of the European Central
Bank.
These two Resolutions, if followed, should introduce
progressively, even if not painlessly, 'better' behaviour into the economy
(P6), including, I predict from P3, the return of the Phillips relationship.
The conclusion drawn from P1 with P6 and demonstrated in
Table 1, that under a well behaved economy inflation is in the long run
zero, would seem to have considerable implications for presentations of the
macroeconomy, such as the familiar AS-AD schema, in which inflation is a
major variable.
Since a well behaved economy is ex hypothesi (D5) easier
to understand, and therefore to predict and so control than a badly behaved
one, there is a strong case for giving a high priority to implementing R1
and R2 so as to restore good behaviour, rather than attempting to manage in
the traditional way a badly behaved economy with ever-increasing complexity
and opacity. This may mean putting right some historical mistakes.
Failure to grasp the nettle however will deprive us of
any hope of returning to an economy which is by its very nature immune to
endemic inflation; and will condemn us to live in perpetual and increasing
fear of national or global meltdown, from which we will have then no
trustworthy defence and no obvious means of recovery.
Security from these twin maladies is offered to us by
neither the euro nor the floating pound. However at least if we retain
control of our own economy we shall afford ourselves the leisure to
determine the way ahead, and the political authority to implement our own
decisions, once reached, upon our own currency. Subsequently, those who
speak of Britain 'taking a lead' in matters economic may yet find a genuine
opportunity to do so.
©
Martin Mosse,
BRAINWAVES
2001.
Table 1: Prices since 1661 (1661=100)*
Figures for each decade are along a horizontal line:
e.g. that for 1667=88, for 1944=195.
|
|
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
166- |
|
100 |
103 |
101 |
96 |
96 |
92 |
88 |
88 |
84 |
|
167- |
85 |
84 |
81 |
80 |
86 |
92 |
88 |
81 |
82 |
87 |
|
168- |
85 |
82 |
82 |
80 |
81 |
83 |
84 |
74 |
74 |
73 |
|
169- |
75 |
76 |
75 |
78 |
87 |
87 |
89 |
90 |
95 |
98 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
170- |
85 |
74 |
73 |
70 |
73 |
66 |
75 |
65 |
68 |
79 |
|
171- |
90 |
100 |
75 |
72 |
76 |
77 |
73 |
70 |
69 |
72 |
|
172- |
75 |
74 |
68 |
66 |
70 |
72 |
75 |
71 |
73 |
77 |
|
173- |
70 |
65 |
66 |
63 |
65 |
66 |
64 |
69 |
67 |
66 |
|
174- |
74 |
80 |
73 |
70 |
62 |
63 |
69 |
67 |
70 |
71 |
|
175- |
70 |
67 |
69 |
67 |
67 |
68 |
68 |
81 |
78 |
74 |
|
176- |
73 |
70 |
70 |
74 |
75 |
78 |
79 |
81 |
80 |
73 |
|
177- |
74 |
79 |
87 |
88 |
86 |
84 |
84 |
80 |
87 |
82 |
|
178- |
81 |
85 |
86 |
95 |
93 |
89 |
88 |
87 |
90 |
87 |
|
179- |
92 |
90 |
90 |
95 |
101 |
109 |
114 |
110 |
110 |
118 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
180- |
157 |
169 |
129 |
115 |
119 |
138 |
136 |
138 |
151 |
157 |
|
181- |
153 |
152 |
175 |
180 |
155 |
141 |
127 |
140 |
144 |
128 |
|
182- |
115 |
105 |
101 |
104 |
106 |
115 |
102 |
102 |
97 |
95 |
|
183- |
95 |
97 |
95 |
93 |
97 |
97 |
107 |
102 |
103 |
113 |
|
184- |
111 |
105 |
96 |
91 |
94 |
95 |
95 |
100 |
87 |
82 |
|
185- |
82 |
79 |
82 |
97 |
108 |
108 |
108 |
110 |
96 |
100 |
|
186- |
104 |
100 |
104 |
105 |
103 |
102 |
104 |
102 |
100 |
93 |
|
187- |
95 |
100 |
111 |
110 |
105 |
102 |
100 |
95 |
88 |
85 |
|
188- |
89 |
86 |
88 |
88 |
82 |
76 |
72 |
70 |
73 |
73 |
|
189- |
76 |
75 |
71 |
71 |
64 |
62 |
63 |
64 |
68 |
73 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
190- |
79 |
75 |
75 |
75 |
72 |
75 |
81 |
84 |
76 |
80 |
|
191- |
84 |
86 |
91 |
91 |
91 |
116 |
146 |
193 |
207 |
222 |
|
192- |
270 |
167 |
141 |
139 |
150 |
146 |
136 |
131 |
129 |
124 |
|
193- |
104 |
89 |
86 |
85 |
103 |
103 |
106 |
110 |
113 |
113 |
|
194- |
152 |
205 |
195 |
177 |
195 |
191 |
191 |
205 |
219 |
227 |
|
195- |
234 |
251 |
269 |
273 |
276 |
287 |
301 |
312 |
319 |
319 |
|
196- |
322 |
333 |
347 |
354 |
365 |
379 |
396 |
404 |
425 |
446 |
|
197- |
474 |
513 |
545 |
595 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
*Linked index. Main sources: Mitchell and Deane,
Abstracts of British Historical Statistics, and Department of Employment,
British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract 1886-1968.
Basic Series: Schrumpeter-Gilboy price index 1661-1697
(1697=100) and 1696-1823 (1701=100); Rousseaux price indexes 1800-1923 (1865
to 1885=100); Sauerbeck Statist price indexes 1846-1938 (1867 to 1877=100);
DE index of the internal purchasing power of the pound 1914-1968 (1963=100).
Series rebased on 1661=100 using the multipliers
1697=100, 0.9174: 1701=100, 0.7399; 1865-1885=100, 0.8679; 1867-1877=100,
1.0761; 1963=100, 5.5417.
Source: The Economist, July 13, 1974, as
reproduced in William Rees-Mogg, The Reigning Error (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1974), p.69.




William Rees-Mogg, The Reigning Error - The Crisis of World Inflation
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1974).
Glyn Davies, A History of Money (Cardiff: University of Wales
Press, 1994; paperback edition, with revisions and Postcript, 1996).
Foreward by The Right Honourable Viscount Tonypandy, PC, DCL. I am
deeply indebted to Professor Davies for the warm encouragement and
valuable editorial advice with which he greeted my original draft.
M. Burda and C. Wyplosz, Macroeconomics - A European Text
(Oxford: OUP, Second edition 1997).
F. Capie and A. Webber, A Monetary History of the United Kingdom,
1870-1982, Volume I: Data, Sources, Methods (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1985).
Michael Stewart, Keynes and After (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1967,
revised 1969) p.230.
Author's correction for 1/243, believed to be a slip in the original.
Professor Ivor Pearce, 'Let's get back to proper money', The Sunday
Telegraph, 11 April 1982.
As defined by Capie and Webber, op. cit. chapter 14 §IX pp.316-320.
The data were extracted from Capie and Webber, op. cit. as follows:
M1 Velocity annual (1922-1962): Table I(9) col IV.
M1 Velocity quarterly (1963.Q1-1982.Q3): Table I(7)
col VII.
M3 Velocity annual (1922-1962): Table I(9) col V.
M3 Velocity quarterly (1963.Q1-1982.Q3): Table I(8)
col VII.
Yield on Consols annual (1922-1962) and quarterly
(1963.Q1-1982.Q3): Table III(10) col VIII.
Capie and Webber do not provide a comprehensive table
for M1 or M3 velocity sampling the whole period either annually or
quarterly.
F. W. Paish, Benham's Economics - A General Introduction, Eighth
edition
(Pitman Paperbacks, 1967) pp.391-6.
A. W. Phillips, 'The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of
Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom', Economica,
November 1958, pp. 283-299.
Op. cit. p.290. The curve crosses the x axis close to x = 5.48, that
is, the expected rate of unemployment when inflation is zero.
For convenience: although Phillips himself argued closely from wage
inflation, it is now normal to view it in terms of price inflation
without, it is felt, any loss of generality.
The sources for Figure 2 and Figure 3 are
1914-1986: M. Parkin and R. Bade, Modern
Macroeconomics (Philip Allan, Second Edition 1988) pp.37-39.
1987-1997 Unemployment: Annual Abstract of
Statistics 1998 (Office for National Statistics), Table 6.1 (Crown
Copyright 2000).
1987-1997 Retail Price Index: Whitaker's Almanack
1999, 131st Edition, ed. Hilary Marsden (London: The Stationery
Office Ltd, 1998)
The data for Figure 4 are computed from Capie and Webber, op.cit:
London Clearing Banks:
Cash = Table III(7) col I.
Deposits = Table III(4) col I.
All UK Banks:
Cash = Table II(2) col
III.
Deposits = Table II(1) col IV
(Demand, DD),
+ Table II(1) col VI (Time, TD)
+ Table III(2) col IV (Other, OD).
This is described in detail in Capie and Webber, op.cit. pp. 11, 222, as
well as Davies, op. cit. pp. 406-7, 420-423.
Davies, op. cit. pp.397, 432.
Op. cit, Chapter Four, 'The Case for Gold'.
Alan Greenspan, Gold and Economic Freedom (1966), quoted by
William Rees-Mogg, article 'Is Gold only for fools?' (The Times,
20 November 1997).
Burda and Wyplosz, op. cit. p. 304.
Dr Charles Hickson, 'A Critique on Money: An Institutional Perspective',
Payments - Past, Present and Future (APACS, 1995), pp.109-134.
This writer owes his copy to the kindness of Professor Davies.
Graham Bannock, R. E. Baxter and Evan Davis, The Penguin Dictionary
of Economics, Sixth Edition (London: Penguin, 1998).
George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism [Open Society
Endangered] (London: Little, Brown, 1998).
I owe some of the fundamental ideas in this section to John Laughland,
The Tainted Source - The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea
(London: Warner, 1998), Chapter V 'Money Matters'.
Economic models at the Bank of England, (Bank of England, 1999)
p.3.
Treaty on European Union (7 February 1992), Protocol 'On the
Convergence Criteria Referred to in Article 109j of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community', Article 1.
The European single currency, European Movement, January 2000.
The rather quaint 'guaranteed' is left unexplained. The usual effect of
inflation, high or low, is to reduce the value of savings. Hence
'progressively erode' would seem more accurate than 'protect'. Language
is too precious a gift to be abused.
I am indebted to my cousin Commodore James Fanshawe, R.N. for his
insight that the 'human frailty of greed' is indeed the fundamental
problem of economics (letter 21 September 1999). Whilst human nature
remains what it is I cannot imagine a cashless society working.
J. M. Keynes, 'Is the pound over-valued?' New Republic, New York,
6 May 1925, quoted in Davies. op. cit. p. 378.
Op. cit. p.374; see also pp.644, 653.
Some rough calculations suggest that a gold coin worth £20 would weigh
about the same as a present day 20p piece; while one worth £50 would
have about the same weight as a 50p piece. So although a gold £5 might
not be feasible until prices have fallen markedly, £5 notes could still
be redeemable four at a time.
John Laughland, 'The Bank of England should be privatised; it should
mint a gold sovereign; and banknotes should be convertible on demand',
The Times, 12 January 1999.
The Reigning Error, Chapter Five.
Davies, op. cit. pp.303-315.
|