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BRAINWAVES REPORT BW/004
GOD, MATHS AND PLATO
An exercise in metaphysics
WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?
I once asked a colleague whether he
supposed that life was meant to be an exercise in thinking. He reflected
for a moment. ‘Doesn’t seem probable,’ he replied sagely. ‘Too many people
never give it a try!’
METAPHYSICS
is all about how we think. It shows how our various departments of
knowledge and experience relate to each other as a single unity in which
they find their meaning.
These departments in my belief meet like
the spokes at the hub of a bicycle wheel. Metaphysics is then the study of
this hub, which is God. If God really exists, the spokes are
interconnected. So in the jingle,
To correlate is all our aim,
Link Latin on to statics;
Co-ordinate theology
With higher
mathematics.
(Anon)
The postmodern, materialist view is that
this can’t be done. No such unity exists. There is no ultimate meaning, no
interconnections, no metanarrative. Metaphysics is nonsense. And there is
emphatically no God.
Perhaps we need to do some thinking about
what we are actually looking for and where we expect to find it. Let us
try.
MYSTERY, PERSONALITY AND NUMBER
According to one possible approach to
metaphysics, which I rather like, there are three fundamental concepts:
MYSTERY, PERSONALITY, and NUMBER. Let us take them in order.
(1) MYSTERY is what makes certain things
and people special. For example, gold, royalty, and Shakespeare.
There will always be people who insist that nothing is special and
everything must be as drab as everything else. (In my experience these are
usually atheists!) Anything or anyone out of line is condemned by them as
‘superstition’, 'elitist', ‘privileged’, ‘outmoded’ etc. But it is the
special things that add colour to life and make it interesting for
everyone.
MYSTERY also incorporates paradox,
which is to be found wherever we discover two apparent opposites, both of
which we want to affirm. It is common in theology, where most notoriously
the free will of man and the sovereignty of God appear to be in total
conflict. We find it also in physics, in which light sometimes seems to
behave as particles and sometimes as waves, which again appears to be a flat
contradiction. Exploring how we maintain both always presents a fruitful
challenge to our intellects. Conversely, if we by-pass the MYSTERY by
rejecting one or other of the opposing truths and so pretending it doesn’t
exist, life suddenly becomes boring. Further, the MYSTERY always comes back
to bite you later on. It reasserts itself. If we do not ask the
fundamental questions we are unlikely to come up with the fundamental
answers; but somebody else will!
(2) PERSONALITY: I think of this as being
characterised particularly by the ability to communicate.
(3) NUMBER: We will come to this.
One can see God in each of these three
concepts, and in the interplay between them.
In fact, the trio can prove very powerful
in analysing different belief systems:
For instance the Old Testament Jews
were strong on both MYSTERY and PERSONALITY. So Yahweh can speak: ‘I AM WHO
I AM’ (Exodus 3:14); ‘I love you’ (cf. Isaiah 43:1-7). Yet they were
hopeless on NUMBER (1 Kings 7:23 effectively gives p as 3 - the least
accurate value assigned to it by any known ancient civilisation).
The Greeks by contrast were strong
on NUMBER - they gave us mathematics as a reasoned, structured discipline.
The great oriental faiths of
Hinduism and Buddhism are strong on MYSTERY but weaker on God as
PERSONALITY.
Protestantism
- especially Reformation Protestantism or evangelicalism - is weak on
MYSTERY and on the whole deeply suspicious of anything that could be deemed
superstition. But it is strong on PERSONALITY, with a penchant for hymns
like J. M. Scriven's ‘What a friend we have in Jesus’.
FIRST LAW OF METAPHYSICS
I offer then as the first law of our
metaphysics the proposition that GOD EXISTS. There is a hub to our
bicycle wheel. All other laws of metaphysics either derive from this or are
equivalent. How would we set about validating it? This takes us into the
branch of metaphysics called ONTOLOGY, which is concerned with
questions like, In what different ways can things exist?
In particular, what can the word ‘exist’
mean when applied to God? Is it even a legitimate usage? Does our bicycle
wheel have a hub?
I propose a TEST CASE. Two very prominent
and contrasting spokes in our wheel of knowledge are FAITH and
REASON. Are these contradictory? Or are they complementary, opposite
sides of the same coin? If we can demonstrate that they meet, we shall have
found the hub, and so vindicated our First Law.
Let us imagine ourselves to be on a
clifftop on a foggy day. Ahead of us, over the sea, lies the “Cloud of
Unknowing”, which we may term the “Fog of Unthinking”.
Two direction-finding radars, some distance
apart on the clifftop, point out to sea in search of Ultimate Truth,
Absolute Reality, God (not necessarily Christian). Is there anything there,
in the fog? The radar beams are, as just named:
(1) FAITH, the path of religion, which for
today's purposes we shall think of as monotheist (e.g. Christian, Jewish, or
Islamic). This beam supplies meaning to our term ‘GOD’. It has in
each case its own book: the Bible (or some other such as the Koran). This
beam gives us one steer into the fog.
(2) REASON, the path of abstract thought.
This supples meaning to our term ‘EXISTS’. It too has a book,
which I nominate as Plato’s Republic. This beam gives us another
steer into the fog.
Do these two beams converge? If FAITH and
REASON meet, we may reasonably claim that a (monotheistic) GOD EXISTS.
THE BEAM OF FAITH
[Here we view the slide listing the
‘photofit’ (mostly) ontological characteristics of God as suggested by FAITH
(appended)]
THE BEAM OF REASON
PLATO (c.429-347 BC) was a
pupil and admirer of Socrates, the father of western philosophy. He wrote a
series of dialogues, consisting of conversations between Socrates and
his fellow-Athenians on topics of philosophical interest. The early
dialogues are probably historical. The later ones, such as The Republic,
use the same format as a vehicle for what is generally considered to be
Plato’s own thought as he developed it.
The Republic
(c.375 B.C.) is arguably the greatest and most influential
non-religious book on metaphysics - and so on learning to think - ever
written: It takes the form of a discussion about justice - in the
abstract, in the individual and in the state. The world, says Plato, will
become just when philosophers (thinkers) become kings. This raises the
question, How do we train the philosophers? Using Socrates as a mouthpiece,
Plato lays down a programme of education designed to teach them to work with
abstracts.
Here in The Republic and in his
other dialogues, Plato considers just what are the essences, essentials
of things, which he calls forms or ideas? These forms exist
in a realm of their own, being in his view more real than the objects
of sensation in our physical world, which actually owe their very existence
and characteristics to the forms. They are apprehended by the mind.
We are introduced to the forms through our
attempts to define material objects such as tables and chairs. Then we
progress upwards to moral concepts such as courage, holiness, justice etc,
and ultimately towards a supreme Form of Goodness (by analogy, the
sun) from which all else derives.
Today this sounds a little quaint. Or does
it? For one intermediate rung on Plato's ladder, essential to the training
of the thinker, is mathematics.
Mathematics is by its very nature concerned with abstracts. The numbers
which are the subject matter of arithmetic are not just quantities of
things but abstractions, of interest in their own right.
The triangles and circles that we look at when we study geometry are
but imperfect images of their abstract forms.
Can it be said with Plato that such mathematical objects exist?
IS MATHEMATICS DISCOVERED OR INVENTED?
This brings us to the central issue in the
philosophy of mathematics: Is mathematics discovered or invented?
This in turn leads us into two
fields:
(1) Psychology - of art, creativity,
inspiration, brainwaves. This relates to the domain of PERSONALITY; we
will bypass it today.
(2) Ontology - in this case the
existential status of mathematics. Here we are in the domain of NUMBER,
which we will explore.
There are two main accounts of mathematics:
(a) Platonism
When not on the defensive against
philosophers, most mathematicians speak, write and act as though they live
corporately in a shared world of absolute truths which are there for them to
discover and which are common ground between them.
So in practice, most mathematicians are Platonists most of the time.
(b) Formalism
When challenged to justify their Platonism
by modern day philosophers mathematicians often get embarrassed, taking
refuge in formalism: This is the doctrine that mathematics is no
more than the process of deducing conclusions from premises - proving
theorems from axioms. The axioms themselves are generally held
to be either self-evident or otherwise chosen for their mathematical
convenience. So starting from the geometrical axioms of Euclid (c.300
BC) we can prove Pythagoras’ theorem. If we started with different axioms
(as has been done), we would reach different conclusions. Hence according
to formalism, the theorem is just spelling out in longhand something that
was already implicit in the axioms, no more than a tautology (and not only a
tautology; it says the same thing twice!). It says nothing about the real
world that we didn’t in principle know already. All we are doing is
manipulating concepts which have no necessary reference to the physical
world at all, let alone an invisible world of abstracts with a special mode
of existence. Proof is simply following the rules. ‘Meaning’ is an
irrelevance which it is futile to explore.
Formalism is the principal alternative to
Platonism. Under Plato, the truths and objects of mathematics are there
somewhere, waiting to be discovered. The theorems are already true; by
proving them we are just demonstrating what is actually the case. Formalism
maintains they aren’t anywhere: we just invent them as we go along by
deducing them from axioms we have ourselves chosen.
What is at stake? If Plato is right about
mathematics, there really exists a world of (mathematical, at least)
abstracts for the radar beam of REASON to lock on to. The metaphysician is
in business. If not, he is chasing after wind.
CRITIQUE OF FORMALISM
(1) In practice, formalism is seldom what
actually happens.
Mathematicians do not generally sit down with a set of axioms in front of
them in order to see what follows. Far more often, they work at the
‘business end’ of mathematics, and tie up the nuts and bolts (if at all)
afterwards. So in the late seventeenth century, both Newton and Leibniz
independently came up with the calculus. It was not for another 140 years
that the calculus was made rigorous by analysis (by Cauchy, 1821-3,
and others).
(2) Formalism gives no adequate account of
why, if mathematics has no meaning or reference to the real world,
applied mathematics almost universally forms the basis of science. When
scientists want to begin a conceptual revolution, they look often for fresh
mathematics in order to describe it. So Einstein based his theory of
relativity on non-Euclidean geometry which had been developed in the
previous half-century. When Heisenberg in 1925 needed a non-commutative
multiplication to support quantum mechanics, he turned to matrices
(developed by the Englishman Cayley c.1858). So we require a
connection between pure mathematics and the physical sciences which
formalism by its nature does not offer and cannot explain.
One way out of this (adopted by Kline)
is to minimise the role of pure mathematics, so important to
formalism, and see mathematics rather as a purely human invention
developed in order to meet the needs (eg military or artistic) of society at
given times.
‘Mainstream’ mathematics is then by its nature applied. This may be
truer to life than formalism as an account of what happens, but is open to a
fatal objection which we will give below.
(3) Formalism cannot explain the massively
documented experience of mathematicians that in practice they do occupy a
shared world in which their concepts are really there to be examined by
them and their colleagues. They assume the reality of their subject
matter whenever they communicate with their fellows, even if they cannot
justify it. Otherwise they would have nothing in common to talk about.
Such concepts include mathematical
structures such as finite simple groups. Mathematicians have spent
years classifying these as lepidopterists classify butterflies.
Again, mathematicians investigating the Riemann Hypothesis, by computing the
zeros of the zeta function, have uncovered an infinite and unpredictable
mathematical ‘landscape’ of hills and valleys, billions of which are being
investigated every day by computer in search of a particular (ir)regularity.
It seems a little odd to maintain that such things in no way ‘exist’. If
they did not, why would anyone bother?
As an alternative to Platonism, formalism
fails because it does not describe what mathematicians actually do, and
cannot justify the practical use of mathematics made by scientists.
THE CASE FOR PLATONISM
Can Platonism be made good in its own
right? Let us consider.
(1) We have just argued that some
mathematical structures lay a claim to ‘existence’. The formalist would not
agree, since these are defined by axioms which have been selected by
people. They have no external reference. Suppose we grant this.
Are there any areas of mathematical research which are not dependent
upon axioms? Orthodoxy says no, but I think there are: NUMBERS. The
concept of NUMBER is one of our three fundamentals (in spite of failed
attempts by Frege (late nineteenth century) and others to define numbers in
terms of sets). NUMBERS HAVE PROPERTIES in their own right which are
independent of axioms. For instance:
(a) PRIME NUMBERS - whole numbers
(greater than 1) which have no factors other than 1 and themselves - simply
are what they are by their own very nature.
They owe nothing to axioms. They are probably the most intriguing and most
intensely researched topic in mathematics today.
(b) CONSTANTS such as p and e
are phenomenally important to all manner of mathematics.
They crop up everywhere. Without them mathematics would be impossible.
Being therefore totally independent of axioms, they constitute in themselves
a full refutation of formalism. Likewise Kline’s view that mathematics is a
purely human invention falls to the ground when we ask, which human being
determined that p and e should have the values that they do? If
their values are not objectively determined by factors beyond the human
ambit, as under Platonism, why are we unable to change them at will?
This takes us to bedrock. Numbers are not
defined by axioms, yet have immutable and objective properties in
their own right which can be investigated.
Hence, as held by Plato, numbers must exist in a significant,
non-trivial way.
(2) Euler in 1748 demonstrated the unity of
the ‘core mathematics’ of his day: trigonometry (founded upon p), complex
numbers (founded upon i, the square root of minus one), exponentials
and logarithms (both founded upon e), together with a whole mass of
infinite series. Every particle and every wave pulse everywhere and at all
times in the universe exemplify the core truths represented in Euler’s
Identities,
just as every cell in our bodies exhibits our personal DNA. We have just
seen that the constants e and p are essential to mathematics. It is
now clear that they are essential to physics as well. Without them no
physical universe would be even imaginable.
(Contrast the physical constants: we could at least imagine a universe in
which gravity or the other physical forces had different strengths, even if
it did not last very long or could not produce life.) So mathematics is
neither a mere invention of the human mind, nor a collection of meaningless
tautologies: its truths are essential to the very existence of the universe.
They are objective.
(3) It is inherent in mathematics that any
theorem, once proved, is known to be universally valid. We do not have to
travel to the moon or to the far side of the universe in order to retest its
validity there: we know it will be valid. (We may pause to reflect
how we know this; but know it we do.) Mathematics is independent
of place.
(4) Correspondingly, mathematical truths,
if true at all, will have been true before the big bang (forgive the
inadequacy of language) and will go on being true after the ‘big crunch’ (or
whatever else ends the universe): they are timeless, with no
beginning or end, and actually independent of the universe altogether.
They would have been true had there never been a universe. (Under what
circumstances would two and two not have equalled four?)
(5) Any attempt to locate the concepts of
mathematics in the minds that share them
runs instantly into the problem of continuity: what happens when the owners
of those minds die? Do their theorems cease to be true?
We recall the ancient conumdrum, how do we
know that things exist when no one is perceiving them? - and Bishop
Berkeley’s answer that all things exist in the mind of God.
This gave rise to a celebrated limerick by Ronald Knox (1924), of which a
variant reads,
There once was a man who said, ‘God,
I find it exceedingly odd
That the sycamore tree
Should continue to be
When there’s no one about in the Quad.’
To which came the equally celebrated
anonymous reply,
Dear Sir,
Your astonishment’s odd:
I
am always about in the Quad.
And that’s why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by,
Yours faithfully,
God.
While perhaps, like Plato’s forms, this may
be a little unconvincing in respect of material objects like tables and
chairs and trees, it does give one pause for thought in respect of the
objects of mathematics, and a clue as to their nature.
Mathematics is therefore discovered, not
invented. Plato was right. We
may contrast language, which by common consent exists purely by
convention. Developments in language have no known implications anywhere in
the universe beyond planet Earth.
THE BEAUTY OF MATHEMATICS
Further, mathematics is by the universal
consent of its practitioners capable of great beauty. Indeed as G.H.
Hardy (1877-1947), credited as the founder of modern analytic number theory,
put it,
Beauty is the first test [of good
mathematics]: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly mathematics.
It is the beauty of mathematics which
attracts many of its practitioners in the first place. I had a colleague
who was converted to mathematics when he first discovered that most
beautiful and surprising of all equations,
eip =
-1 (or, eip +
1 = 0),
which follows directly from Euler’s
Identities mentioned above. One could write an entire book about that
equation, and all that it carries with it. (Actually , I have.)
The delight with which mathematics inspires
in its captivated worshippers has seldom been better exemplified than in the
life of the perpetually boyish ‘mathematical monk’, Hungarian-born number
theorist Paul Erdös (1913-1996), whose love of the subject, and the
happiness it inspired in him, were simply infectious.
THE MYSTERY OF MATHEMATICS
The MYSTERY of mathematics is
well pinpointed by Gian-Carlo Rota:
‘The mystery of mathematics...is that
conclusions originating in the play of the mind do have striking practical
applications.’
Or, as Einstein put it,
‘How can it be that mathematics, being
after all a product of human thought independent of experience, is so
admirably adapted to the objects of reality?’
Mathematics is on the one hand abstract, a
set of concepts we apprehend and manipulate with our minds as formalism
describes. On the other hand, its truths are external and independent of
us, being inherent in the entire structure of the universe; the starting
point of science. These two characteristics seem irreconcilable. Does
mathematics or does it not have external reference? So at the heart of
mathematics lies a MYSTERY.
CONVERGENCE
We have now fully vindicated Plato’s case
for the independent existence of a world of abstracts in which the
truths, structures and objects of mathematics are to be found, and are
available to all who seek them. They emerge as objective, absolute,
timeless and universal, exactly as Plato held. They are nevertheless
essential to any scientific description of the universe and permeate it
throughout. Without them no universe could exist or be even imaginable.
Yet they are independent of it - transcend it - and have in addition a
beauty which entrances the beholder and a MYSTERY which defies explanation.
We have discovered all this with the radar beam of REASON.
This being so, it renders invalid
objections to belief in God on the grounds that He cannot be perceived by
our five senses. Such an objection would reject also the whole of
mathematics, which would be an ‘eet’ (opposite of T for truth) or logical
banana: intellectual suicide.
Further, revisiting our slide, we see that
in mathematics we have discovered something which is admirably described by
the ‘photofit’ picture of God which we gave at the beginning from the beam
of FAITH. Think about it. There is at least one entity possessing all the
properties that on the basis of FAITH we formerly assigned to God. So the
radar beam of FAITH has scored a hit! FAITH and REASON have therefore
converged. They complement each other, as opposite sides of the same
coin. Our bicycle wheel has a hub, which is what we set out to
demonstrate. Ergo, we claim a validation of our First Law of Metaphysics:
GOD EXISTS. Q.E.D. (!)
And every time we discover that two spokes
of our personal bicycle wheel converge at the hub, we reaffirm the same Law.
ENDNOTE: WHY CHRISTIANITY?
‘In the beginning was the Logos.
And the Logos was with God. And the Logos was God.’ (John
1:1)
Logos,
the name given here to Christ, has two clusters of meaning. First, it means
a word, speech, or communication. We recall our concept of
PERSONALITY: One who is personal and can reveal himself personally and
verbally, as in the Judaeo-Christian revelation recorded in the Bible and
recognised by FAITH.
Second, it means a computation,
reckoning, account, the statement of a theory, an argument, principle or
reason. From it comes indirectly our word logic. We recall our
concept of NUMBER, including mathematics, which meets John’s description of
the Logos, ‘through which all things were made and without which was
not anything made that was made’ (John 1:3); so One who may be recognised by
REASON, along the lines opened up by Plato’s Republic.
St John identifies the convergence of both
the subject of FAITH and the object of REASON in the person of
Jesus of Nazareth, the Word made flesh and the Light of the World.
To whom be all glory and honour, Amen.
©
Martin Mosse,
BRAINWAVES, September 2006.
WANTED
(PREFERABLY ALIVE)
GOD
ALIAS:
Absolute Truth
Objective Reality
Key of Knowledge
DESCRIPTION:
Present everywhere
Independent of time and
space
Infinite in extent,
variety, depth and complexity
Integral to the entire
universe
Not subject to change
Not detectable by the five
senses or by scientific investigation
Mysterious
Beautiful to apprehend
Able to absorb and inspire
awe and reverence in seekers
CAUTION:
Full of surprises.
Approach with care
REWARD:
The ability to think
IF FOUND:
Please pass it on
Edited notes of a talk given to staff and pupils in the Philosophical
Society of Monkton Combe School, Somerset on 22 September 2006.
I understand that this rhyme first appeared in the Croydon High School
Magazine, long ago.
E.g. Republic VII, 525d:
‘I mean that arithmetic has, in a
marked degree, that elevating effect of which we were speaking,
compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling
against the introduction of numbers which have visible or tangible
bodies into the argument.’ (tr. Benjamin Jowett, 1871)
E.g. Republic VI, 510d-e:
‘And do you not know also that although
they make use of the [geometrical] forms and reason about them, they are
thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not
of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the
absolute diameter, and so on - the forms which they draw and make,
and which themselves have shadows and reflections in water, are in turn
converted by them into images; for they are really seeking to behold
the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?’
(tr. Jowett; cf. 527b)
‘Is mathematics an act of creation or a discovery? Many mathematicians
fluctuate between feeling they are being creative and a sense they are
discovering absolute scientific truths. Mathematical ideas can often
appear very personal and dependent on the creative mind that conceived
them. Yet that is balanced by the belief that its logical character
means that every mathematician is living in the same mathematical world
that is full of immutable truths. These truths are simply waiting to be
unearthed, and no amount of creative thinking will undermine their
existence.' - Marcus du Sautoy, The Music of the Primes: Why an
Unsolved Problem in Mathematics Matters (London: Fourth Estate,
2003), pp.33-4.
The clearest expression of this process that I know is given by
Professor Andrew Wiles, who in 1994 astonished the mathematical world
with his proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem:
‘Then I just had to find something
completely new - it’s a mystery where that comes from.
‘Basically it’s just a matter of
thinking. Often you write something down to clarify your thoughts, but
not necessarily. In particular when you’ve reached a real impasse, when
there’s a real problem that you want to overcome, then the routine kind
of mathematical thinking is of no use to you. Leading up to that kind
of new idea there has to be a long period of tremendous focus on the
problem without any distraction. You really have to think about nothing
but that problem - just concentrate on it. Then you stop. Afterwards
there seems to be a kind of period of relaxation during which the
subconscious appears to take over and it’s during that time that some
new insight comes.’
Quoted in Simon Singh, Fermat’s Last
Theorem: The Story of a Riddle that Confounded the World’s Greatest
Minds for 358 Years (London: Fourth Estate, 1997) p.228.
‘For me, and I suppose for most mathematicians, there is another
reality, which I will call “mathematical reality”....I believe that
mathematical reality lies outside us, that our function is to discover
or observe it, and that the theorems which we prove, and which we
descrbe grandiloquently as our “creations”, are simply the notes of our
observations. This view has been held, in one form or another, by many
philosophers of high reputation from Plato onwards.’ - G.H. Hardy, A
Mathematician’s Apology (1940; Cambridge: CUP 1992) pp.123-4;
emphasis original.
So R.G.D. Allen, Basic Mathematics (London: Macmillan, 1962),
pp.2-7, gives an excellent, mainline description of the formalist
‘axiomatic approach’ to modern mathematics, only to undermine it fatally
in a concluding footnote (p.7): ‘A formal system developed strictly on
the axiomatic method would be highly symbolised and a rather arid
affair. Here we compromise in order to provide a general exposition
which explains what is going on. It might be described as “informal
axiomatics”.’ So as an account of what mathematicians actually do,
formalism cannot be made good even by a professed believer in it!
Morris Kline, Mathematics for the Nonmathematician (New York:
Dover, 1985).
So also Lancelot Hogben, in his stimulating book, Mathematics for the
Million, third edition (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1951),
presents mathematics in terms of its social dimension. ‘Without a
knowledge of mathematics, the grammar of size and order, we cannot plan
the rational society in which there will be leisure for all and poverty
for none.’ (p.20). For his failure to appreciate ‘real’ mathematics, or
any mathematics at all above ‘school’ level, he is roundly castigated by
Hardy (op. cit. pp.137-8). Kline’s retort (op. cit. p.556) that we
should ‘keep a copious quantity of salt on hand’ while reading A
Mathematician’s Apology tells us more about Kline than it does about
Hardy.
Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh, The Mathematical Experience (Harmondsworth:
Pelican, 1981), pp.203-09.
See Marcus du Sautoy, op. cit.
‘Pure mathematics...seems to me a rock on which all idealism founders:
317 is a prime, not because we think so, or because our minds are shaped
in one way or another, but because it is so, because mathematical
reality is built that way.’ - G.H. Hardy, op. cit. p.130; emphasis
original.
See David Wells, Prime Numbers: The Most Mysterious Figures in Math
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005).
p and e are respectively introduced as the ratio of a circle’s
circumference to its diameter (about 3.14159), and the base of natural
logarithms (about 2.71828). On p see David Blatner’s delightful little
compendium, The Joy of p (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997). An
entertaining introduction to e is to be found in Martin Gardner,
Further Mathematical Diversions (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1977),
Chapter 3, ‘The Transcendental Number e’, pp.34-42.
‘’Tis a favourite project of mine,
A new value of p to
assign.
I’d fix it at 3,
For that’s simpler you
see
Than 3 point 1 4 1 5
9.’
- Harvey L. Carter, Professor of
History at Colorado College, quoted in W.S. Baring-Gould, The Lure of
the Limerick (Panther, 1970).
See David Wells’ fascinating compendium, The Penguin Dictionary of
Curious and Interesting Numbers, Revised Edition (London: Penguin,
1997). Not many of them in my judgement owe their inclusion to prior
axioms.
Euler’s Identities: eix
≡ cos x + i sin x;
e-ix
≡ cos x - i sin x.
On the fundamental difference between operations, which are dependent
upon axioms, and constants, which are not:
‘I recall a distinguished professor
explaining how different would be the ordinary life of a race of beings
for whom the fundamental processes of arithmetic, algebra and geometry
were different from those which seem to us to be so evident; but, he
added, it is impossible to conceive of a universe in which e and
p should not exist.’ - W.W. Rouse Ball & H.S.M. Coxeter, Mathematical
Recreations and Essays, Twelfth Edition (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1974) p.348.
As Davis and Hersh, op. cit. pp.397-9.
Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) maintained the idealist philosophical
vew that esse est percipi vel percipere (‘to be is to be
perceived or a peceiver’). He also produced some strong and very just
criticisms of the calculus in the form in which Newton had cast it,
which were not resolved until the development of analysis as mentioned
above.
Another variant of this limerick, with the reply, is attributed in a
similar context to the great Hungarian number theorist Paul Erdös by his
biographer Paul Hoffman, in The Man Who Loved Only Numbers
(London: Fourth Estate, 1998), p.26.
So the devout HIndu Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887-1920), probably the
greatest intuitive mathematician of all time, maintained, ‘An equation
means nothing to me unless it expresses a thought of God.’ (du Sautoy,
op. cit. p.132). See du Sautoy’s whole Chapter 6 on ‘Ramanujan, the
Mathematical Mystic’, which begins with this quotation.
G.H. Hardy, op. cit. p.85.
Martin Mosse, e, i & p:
A Mathematical Drama in Three Acts
(unpublished). So, in somewhat greater depth, has Paul J. Nahin: see
his Dr. Euler's Fabulous Formula Cures Many Mathematical IIlls
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
See - with my strong recommendation - his biography by Paul Hoffman
(details in n.23).
Gian-Carlo Rota, Introduction to Davis and Hersh, op. cit. p.xix.
Albert Einstein (1879-1955), quoted in J. Havil, Gamma: Exploring
Euler’s Constant (Princeton: Princeton Universiity Press, 2003).
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